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The Problem of Membership in International Organization 
W. HARTLEY CLARK 1 
Carleton College 
ABSTRACT - Membership problems plague international organizations of all types. All organi-
zations are in some way exclusive, and there is a hierarchy of acceptable joiner-nations with 
the European nations leading the list. Each organization appears statistically to have a norm of 
membership toward which its number tends. If it falls short of the norm, it is under compulsion 
to expand. If it exceeds the norm, expulsions or boycotts are likely to ensue. The ideal condition 
of an organization, therefore, is "normal" membership, not necessarily "total" inclusion of all 
nations legally admissable. More is to be lost by too large an organization than by one too 
small. There is a superfluity of discrete national memberships in separate organizotions, which 
necessitates amalgamation of organizations. 
When President Sukarno of Indonesia declared his in-
tention of withdrawing his country from the United Na-
tions in order to spite the former imperial powers in that 
organization, his bombshell was met at first by incredu-
lousness and disbelief, even among his own followers and 
among the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations." 
They, like many of us, had been living in a world of mis-
conception about the significance of membership in in-
ternational organizations. They had the vaporous notion 
that at all times international organizations seek benevo-
lently to enlarge their membership and that the members 
of such international organizations can be expected to 
have a benevolent regard for the organizations. There 
went along with the notion, too, the idea that there is 
nothing decisive in just how many or which organiza-
tions a country belongs to-the more the better-in that 
membership in one presumably does not contradict 
membership in another. An international organization 
viewed in this light is like a sponge: soft, benign, and 
absorptive. 
Indonesia's quitting the United Nations has brought to 
the surface the fact that one of the most critical prob-
lems faced by international organizations today is the 
problem of membership. For instance, the Unjted Na-
tions has faced the problem of membership for Red 
China and the question of Soviet Russian membership 
in connection with her refusal to pay her assessments for 
the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations." 
The most critical problem for the Common Market is 
British membership. The most critical problem for the 
'B.A .. Carleton College; M. A. and Ph. D., New York Uni-
versity. Currently. Assistant Professor of Government and Inter-
national Relations. Carleton College. His articles have appeared 
in American Political Science Review, Midwest Political Scie11ce 
Journal. International Conciliation , and in earlier issues of Pro-
ceedi11[:s of MAS. A book, Politics of the Common Market, is 
forthcoming. 
• An Indonesian government note of January 20, 1965 to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations fixed March I, 1965 
as terminal date for its withdrawal from the organization. The 
Secretary-General indicated his willingness to respect the action 
in his note to the Indonesian government of February 26, 1965. 
3 The term "membership" here is being used in its literal sense 
rather than its technical or legal sense. Legally. China is a mem-
ber of the United Nations already, and the Red Chinese issue is 
dealt with as a problem of representation . If the Russians walked 
out over the contributions issue, they would still be likely to 
retain legal membership in the organization. 
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British Commonwealth of Nations has been South Afri-
can membership and now, in a sense, Malaysian mem-
bership. The problem of Spanish membership plagues 
European organizations like NATO and the Council of 
Europe. When we add to this such questions as French 
membership in SEA TO and Cuban membership in the 
Organization of American States, one is tempted to view 
the problem of membership as a contemporary crisis in 
international organization, were it not for the fact that 
such pioneer organizations as the League of Nations 
were victims of critical membership problems, too. The 
League failed partly because the United States did not 
join. The members that were in the League were not ade-
quate to the task of maintaining world security. 
Membership Profile 
A brief profile of the membership of international or-
ganizations wilJ help introduce the problematic aspect of 
membership. According to the Yearbook of International 
Organizations of 1963- I 964,4 which is my major source 
of information on membership in international organiza-
tions, there were 141 entities- I I 7 states, and 24 de-
pendencies-holding membership in 162 separate interna-
tional organizations. The 141 potential members held a 
total of 3778 memberships in the 162 organizations. The 
fact that there are less than 4000 memberships instead of 
6 times that number, as there would be if alJ states be-
longed to all organizations, is a consequence of the fact 
that most international organizations are, for one reason 
or another, exclusive. They may be exclusive because they 
deal with subject matter that only the technologically 
evolved countries can usefully cope with; or because they 
deal with objects that exist at only certain points on the sur-
face of the globe, such as certain minerals or certain 
foods. They may be exclusive clubs for given regions of 
the world, and within given regions there may be further 
grounds for exclusiveness on the basis of technological 
advancement or geography. The exclusive character of 
international organizations is not meant here to mean 
the kind of snobbishness or haughtiness that character-
izes an exclusive golf club , but merely that, for one rea-
• Union of International Associations, 9th ed. (Brussels : Union 
of International Associations. 1962). The Yearbook is a compen-
dium of summary description of individual international organi-
zations. and it lists the members of each organization. 
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son or another, certain nations do not qualify for mem-
bership. Lack of qualifications is not a reflection on a 
given nation. It is no slur against an African nation that 
it cannot become a member of a pan-American organiza-
tion; it simply is not American. 
The tendency for international organizations to be ex-
clusive is borne out by a tabulation of their member-
ships. Some 60 international organizations have l O or 
fewer members; 40 organizations have between 11 and 
20 members; 24 have between 21 and 30 members; and 
the members continue to decline down to the 81 to 90 
bracket, in which there are no organizations at all. This 
inverse relation between the number of organizations 
and the number of their members changes, however, in 
the bracket of organizations with between 10 I and 1 J 0 
members, where 7 organizations, all in the United Na-
tions family, are represented. This break between the 
United Nations family and the tendencies of all other 
organizations, suggests that a different type of exclusive-
ness is applied by the United Nations, albeit, like the 
others, it is in some way exclusive.'' 
Not only do international organizations tend to be ex-
clusive, they rely on a rather exclusive class of desirable 
joiners. One-fifth of the nations of the world account for 
almost one half of al1 memberships in international or-
ganizations. The top 29 nations, in other words, hold 
1786 memberships. France, holding membership in 91 
organizations, is leader, followed by the Netherlands with 
81 memberships. The United States ranks seventh with 
64 memberships. It is the European nations that head 
the list, by and large, although the large number of inter-
American organizations enables 4 Latin-American coun-
tries to figure among the first 29. These, incidentally, are 
the largest countries of Latin America. There is a whole 
fifth of the nations of the world that belong to no more 
than from 12 to 20 international organizations-belong 
to little more, in other words, than the United Nations 
family. Apart from them, international organizations ap-
pear to be made up of exclusive groups of the "right 
kinds" of nations. 
A Norm of Optimum Si:z:e 
In searching for a theory to explain these figures, one 
arrives first of all at the idea of an inverse ratio in inter-
national organizations between size and effectiveness. 
The Common Market is effective, thus, because it is 
small; and the United Nations ineffective because it is 
huge. Or, put it another way, organizations may become 
smaller and smaller in dealing with less and less until 
they are completely effective in nothing; or they may be-
come larger and larger in dealing with more and more 
until they lose effectiveness in everything. This theory is 
too simple, however, to encompass the fact that the 
United Nations has a world-wide membership and is ca-
pable of effective action in certain instances. 
Membership norms are better viewed in their own 
terms. In expressing norms here, I use modal averages, 
• Charter of the United Nations, Article 4 restricts eligibility 
for membership to nations that '"in the judgment of the Organi-
zation" can meet their international obligations. 
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not mew1s or medians. The norm of membership for the 
United Nations and eight other agencies in its family of 
organizations is the membership of the United Nations 
itself that, though changing slightly from year to year, is 
roughly just over I 00. There are some 27 organizations, 
including 7 agencies of the U.N. family with a member-
ship norm of only 40. These are organizations that are 
open to membership from any nation of the world but 
deal with subject matter so technologically demanding 
that the world at large cannot cope with it or relate to it. 
Technological development here implies wealth and com-
merce; thus, only certain nations can take part in the 
Customs Cooperation Councils or the Refrigeration In-
stitute. In other words, once United Nations specialized 
agencies or other world-wide institutions become de-
manding in this way, their normal membership is cut 
down to less than half that of the top United Nations 
group. There are some 32 international organizations 
that are open to all countries in the world but are rele-
vant only to those nations whom fate and geography 
have brought together. The geography of population, for 
instance-the population surplus and deficit areas-deter-
mines the membership of the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee on European Migration. The geographic accident 
of being a littoral state determines the membership of 
the International Maritime Consultative Organization 
and fishing organizations. These organizations, poten-
tially world-wide but actually limited by geography, have 
a normal membership of 20. 
Our norms are now dropping very fast. Having 
reached this level among the organizations open poten-
tially to the world for members however, the norms be-
gin to level off. The next groups of organizations are 
those restricted to members within a given region of the 
globe, such as Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, 
or the Soviet Bloc. The norm for the 19 inter-American 
organizations has been 21 members; the norm for 34 
European organizations has been 16 members; the norm 
for two middle-eastern organizations has been 12, as 
has been the norm for four Soviet Bloc organizations. 
Only in the case of the 30 nations who founded the or-
ganization of African unity does one find an important 
upswing in the number of states embraced by a regional 
entity. 
There is just one further membership norm worth con-
sideration here and that is one dictated by exclusive con-
siderations within regions; the normal membership 
involved here is eight. This last norm is for such organiza-
tions as the Common Market, the Carribbean Organiza-
tion, or the Warsaw Treaty Organization. One of the 
most selective norms is that of the organizations made 
up on the basis of purely political grounds from among 
diverse nations scattered about the globe, such as certain 
units of the British Commonwealth of Nations or the al-
liance organizations, like CENTO or SEATO. This 
norm, too, is eight. In summary, then, there are the 
world organizations with full world membership, the po-
tential world organizations that, for technological rea-
sons, have only half the world as members, the poten-
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tial world organizations that for geographic reasons, 
have only one-fifth the world as members, the regional 
organizations with from 12 to 21 or 30 members, plus 
the restricted regional groupings and political groupings 
with a norm of 8. 
Expand and/ or Die 
What one sees in looking at the membership norms of 
various types of organizations is that large groups of 
them have far fewer than their potential members: po-
tential world organizations with from 20 to 40 members 
and the potential regional organizations with only 8 
members. The mandate for expansion among these or-
ganizations is fairly clear because, in failing to expand, 
they stand to lose touch with the ultimate object of their 
efforts. The International Finance Corporation and In-
ternational Development Association, for example, have 
only three-quarters the membership of the United Na-
tions, and neither can count itself fully effective until the 
missing quarter is made up. The international organiza-
tions of the world concerning fishing are another case in 
point. Each is able to regulate fishing in certain areas of 
the globe, such as the North Pacific or North Atlantic, 
among the littoral nations in those areas. But their fish-
ing grounds are subject to raiding by the ships of gov-
ernments that are not members, thus repeatedly proving 
the necessity for generalizing the world membership of 
organizations aiming to conserve and promote the fish-
ing industries. 
For other organizations, to expand is to die. A live 
man and a dead man look very much alike: the djffer-
ance between the two is extreme but qualjtative-it is 
scarcely visible. International organizations can be killed 
in the same way. Members can be admitted whose exist-
ence in the organization is so destructive of the purposes 
and procedures of that body that, although the change is 
not visible, qualitatively the organization has changed 
and in terms of its original objectives is dead. It is on 
this ground that suitors of numerous international organ-
izations are left today on the doorstep. Red China is 
kept out of the United Nations for not being peace-lov-
ing; Britain has been kept out of the Common Market 
as a result of the sin of a triangular love affair involving 
the Commonwealth. Spain has been kept out of NATO 
and the Council of Europe because it would be a dicta-
torial wolf among democratic sheep. Yugoslovia was ex-
pelled from the Cominform for revisionism; Cuba, from 
the organization of American States, for subversion; and 
the Union of South Africa, from the British Common-
wealth of Nations, for apartheid. Although the merits of 
these cases are subject to ongoing debate, the principle 
involved is a clear one if one looks at it in ideal terms. 
The North Atlantic Treaty organization, for example, is 
primarily concerned with organizing military forces for 
the defense of Western Europe against attack by Soviet 
forces . The Soviet Union, being a European country, 
could conceivably join NATO; but, if it did so, it would 
kill the organization. NATO's reason-for-being would 
be gone. With the Soviet Union as a member, NATO 
would be an alliance among aH the greatest powers in 
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the world against a potential aggressor, but there would 
no longer be any potential aggressor-hence no reason 
for the organization to exist. 
The problem of membership in international organiza-
tions then, is the question of whether an organization 
will die if it expands or whether it will die if it fails to ex-
pand. I would advance the thesis that what I define as 
"perfect" organizations face grave risks in expanding, 
whereas the organizations that I define as "imperfect" 
face real danger if they fail to expand. What I define as 
"perfect" are the world organizations that incl~de gen-
erally all countries in the world, and, also, regional or-
ganizations that include generally all countries of the re-
gion. The "imperfect" organizations are those with po-
tential world membership that, in fact, have less than all 
as members, and the potential regional organizations 
that, in fact, have less than all regional nations as mem-
bers. To put it another way, perfect organizations tend 
to have stable norms of membership while imperfect or-
ganizations tend to have unstable ones. 
Price of Admission 
If we are to work with the hypothesis that organiza-
tions with "normal" membership, like the United Na-
tions, are best served by greatest caution in the admis-
sion of new members, then the presumption would be 
against the admission of Red China to that body. 6 Since 
the United Nations has very nearly universal member-
ship, which is its ideal, then it is advanced very little 
further toward its ideal by the admission of one more 
state. And should that state promise any further trouble 
for the organization, a cautious policy on admission 
would seem the natural one. The question of the admis-
sion of Red China to the United Nations is seldom dis-
cussed in terms of the interests of the organization itself, 
apart from that of any of its members. There are govern-
ments that admire Red China or fear it and feel that 
something should be done for China. They are not con-
cerned directly with doing anything for the United Na-
tions. It is their interests and not that of the organization 
that govern. Unless a case can be made that Red China 
can do something for the United Nations, one fails to 
find any solid grounds for its admission. It might trans-
pire that, in the event of the admission of Red China, the 
price of admission might be paid by other United Na-
tions members in the form of disrupted procedures and 
the obstruction of the interests of the majority of mem--
ber nations. Such a price could scarcely fall within the 
interests of the organization. 
There is some value for neutral nations in the comfort 
that comes from the existence in the United Nations of· 
a powerful veteran obstructionist like the Soviet Union. 
Its willingness to disagree with the former imperial pow-
ers of the West serves to protect the feeling of neutrality 
of those new and weak nations that hate Western im-
perialism above all. But the United Nations can utilize 
only one of this breed. What is the added value in hav-
• The most complete discussion of the Chinese representation 
issue is found in Brown (1955). 
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ing two, both Russia and China? The argument that 
United Nations membership might appease China and 
mollify her is, in effect, offering up the United Nations as 
a sacrifice to detract China from some other potentional 
object of her desires and has nothing to do with the edi-
fication of the United Nations itself. The idea that 
China would behave differently inside the United Nations 
than out of it is guesswork. 
Essentially, the same line of reasoning would under-
line the desirability of leaving the questionable suitor na-
tions standing at the doorstep of any world or regional 
organization having a generally full complement of mem-
bers. They could be left there indefinitely. 7 The United 
Nations applied loose standards over the past decade 
while its drive for universality necessitated wholesale ad-
missions of newly independent nations. Otherwise it 
would have had a patently abnormal membership and 
could thus justify putting membership growth on a par 
with integrity as an ideal. Now that universality has been 
regained, it would be natural for the United Nations to 
become more conscious of its integrity and more willing 
to make calculated judgments on admissions, suspen-
sions, and expulsions. The Indonesian secession from the 
United Nations may have awakened that institution to 
the possibility that, perhaps, under the circumstances In-
donesia should have been expelled. The League of Na-
tions was not destroyed by the withdrawal of the Axis 
powers and the expulsion of Russia. What proved the in-
efficacy of the League was its inability to take action 
against the Axis powers in Asia, Africa, or Europe; and 
it would have faced the same problem whether the Axis 
powers had remained in the League or not-possibly Jess 
of a problem if out, for then they could not have dis-
rupted proceedings. 
The Goose That Laid The Golden Egg 
The organizations, world-wide or regional, that have 
imperfect memberships, i.e., significantly fewer than the 
number of potential members, appear governed by a 
logic that is almost the reverse of the foregoing. The Eu-
ropean Community of the "Six"-Benelux, France, Ger-
many, and Italy-aspires to become a United States of 
Europe. For this it must have both integrity and mem-
bers. The slow progress of the Council of Europe toward 
the same goal, even though it included all the states of 
Europe, prompted the Six to make a start toward a 
United Europe by advancing integration among them-
selves, although they constituted Jess than half the Euro-
pean states. The imperfectness and instability of this ap-
proach became apparent almost immediately: The Com-
munity found it impractical to proceed too far toward 
unity without carrying the other European states, partic-
ularly Britain, along with them; and the British failed to 
see how they could prosper outside the framework of a 
European trading block. Negotiations for British mem-
bership eventually broke down in 1963, however, be-
'Although little is availabl'e as yet on the ostracism of Cuba 
and of the Union of South Africa from their respective organi-
zations, Spanish ostracism from NATO is discussed in Whitaker 
( 1961 ). 
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cause the deGauHe government of France did not wish 
to taint the integrity of the existing community by ad-
mitting Britain and all its outside involvements, particu-
larly those with the United States and the British Com-
monwealth.' The European Community had accom-
plished a miracle in inspiring and underpinning vast eco-
nomic growth in Western Europe. Why kill the goose 
that laid the golden egg by tinkering with the member-
ship question? 
Thus will the necessity for imperfect organizations to 
expand their membership always be subverted. It is the 
anticipation of higher benefits that causes an imperfect 
organization to take the risk of accepting new members 
into its ranks, but there are apt to be be immediate, 
though lesser, benefits in remaining exclusive. The Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
is a conspicuously imperfect organization. It attempts to 
co-ordinate international assistance funds going to the 
underdeveloped world, but includes as members only the 
wealthier and donor nations. Possibly, if some new and 
more ample organization could encompass both donor 
and recipient nations in its membership a higher degree 
of perfection might be achieved in its program. But why 
disturb the goose? The donor nations might be more gen-
erous with their money within the framework of the 
OECD than within the framework of some more repre-
sentative organization. The irony of this situation is that 
false trust in the benefits of exclusiveness is just as dam-
aging to imperfect organizations as false trust in the 
benefits of absolute universality is to perfect ones. 
The Measure of Man 
There is another reasonable standard of membership 
that derives from the nature of man rather than from 
geography. Of the 162 international organizations 124 
have 30 or fewer members. They are, for the most part, 
organizations in which all members can take part in all 
organs or functions. There can be much lost to an in-
ternational organization of any type once its membership 
passes the point where all members can sit down together 
and in a relatively unstructured way talk over their plans 
or differences. Since no regional organization has more 
than 30 members, they will never have to face the prob-
lem in an acute form; but the nearly 60 organizations 
with potentially world-wide membership will be affected, 
probably in a way that will limit their memberships. 
Here again, the natural dynamics of international organ-
izations makes for exclusiveness. 
In order for an organization to break away from this 
restrictive influence it must establish a constitutional sys-
tem by which less than all members can act for all. In 
setting its sights on world-wide membership, the League 
of Nations instituted such a system under the Council, 
whose membership was limited, and a similar arrange-
ment was made later in the United Nations Security 
Council. The executive councils of other world organiza-
tions have been given varying degrees of authority to ex-
• Although possibly overdone, this theme is thoroughly dis-
cussed in Nora Beloff ( 1963) . 
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ercise their organizations' power. But such constitutional 
arrangements, which are a sine qua non in world organ-
izations, are difficult to achieve and maintain. The sys-
tem of executive councils in the League of Nations and 
early United Nations was not put to a severe test because 
the memberships of world organizations then was be-
tween 25 and 50; and there remained the potentiality of 
effective action even in plenary session and in commit-
tees of the whole. It has been the surpassing of the 100-
member figure that has put the United Nations Councils 
to the test and, as we have seen, United Nations Charter 
revision has had to begin in order to ad just the constitu-
tional order to the massive increase in membership. 
ln order to have a world organization, there was no 
choice but to exceed " human dimensions" in the size of 
its membership. There simply could not be "conversa-
tion" among all the nations of the world, and they had 
to act through a constitutional system by which all mem-
bers were represented by a few in an executive council. 
The problem was not that the world organization became 
too big, but that it grew too fast. The United Nations had 
growth pains during the early Sixties as new voting 
groups struggled to find their places in the organization, 
as the structure appeared to need some doing over, and 
as the Secretariat strained to include nationals of the new 
members. The Common Market anticipated similar 
growing pains in connection with the admission of Brit-
ain along, with the trading partners that had formed the 
European Free Trade Association. 
Human dimensions are not only a natural limitation 
on the size of membership of any given organization, 
they are a limitation on the number of organizations a 
single nation can join effectively. It is by no means to 
the benefit of the European nations that they are mem-
bers of so many organizations: the United Nations fam-
ily, numerous other world organizations and equally nu-
merous European organizations. Multiple membership is 
a necessary evil. Many organizations exist in Europe be-
cause they were each started by slightly different mem-
bership, and the difference in membership continued to 
keep them apart. Likewise, the slight differences among 
the membership in organizations of the United Nations 
family has succeeded in keeping them apart. The Inter-
national Labor Organization has an interest in preserving 
its tripartite membership of representatives of govern-
ments, employers, and labor unions. The United Nations 
financial organizations must do without the communist-
bloc nations and certain of the less developed nations. A 
place must be found for the Holy See in the Universal 
Postal Union. 
The price of the multiplicity of organizations is poor 
co-ordination and the diffusion of interest and effort 
among member nations. The value of the amalgamation 
of institutions has been demonstrated recently in the 
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struggle to unify the Coal and Steel Community, the 
Common Market and Euratom within an over-arching 
European Community. The fusion was resisted by the 
deGaulle government on the grounds that it would 
strengthen the Community unduly. Fusion was promoted 
by the other members of the Community precisely to 
achieve greater strength. Earlier, the United Nations took 
steps to strengthen itself by amalgamating its sister or-
ganizations within a single financing scheme for techni-
cal assistance that it controlled through its Economic 
and Social Council. 
One can recognize the motive for leaving a fledgling 
international organization to the nations that show an 
interest in membership. It is impossible to force a larger 
membership upon it, because unwilling members could 
simply say "no" and refuse to co-operate. But when a 
variety of organizations have evolved to the point where 
their memberships approximate the membership norms 
of their regions, or approximate world-wide membership, 
then there is good reason to amalgamate sister organiza-
tions and thus help diminish the number of memberships 
in international organizations by individual nations to 
"human" proportions. Can France validly argue that it 
is able to co-ordinate its interests in 91 international or-
ganizations simultaneously? Once again we see here a 
reason to value the restriction, even diminution, of mem-
berships in international organizations. 
1t appears in the last analysis that, quite contrary to 
the notion that international organizations are served by 
a loose and absorbtive concept of their memberships 
( except in specific cases where organizations suffer from 
membership deficits), most additional membership can 
be undesirable, from several points of view. It may be 
positively destructive of the goals and, therefore, of the 
life of an organization. It may be a case of "too much 
too soon." Or it may exceed humanly manageable pro-
portions. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of 
memberships is their superfluity, deriving from a super-
fluity of organizations of parallel membership; and the 
cause of excess or harmful memberships is more apt to 
be interests of individual nations rather than the inter-
ests of the organizations themselves. 
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